

AESCHYLUS, *AGAMEMNON* 160-91

The following contribution is concerned to examine the arguments which have been brought against the proposal to move the *Zeus Hymn* and its attendant narrative stanza, i.e. all of vv. 160-91, so as to follow v. 217. This proposal was first put forward in *Eranos* 64, 1966, 1-21, and in the interests of making the rest of this paper intelligible I give now a brief statement of the reasons underlying the original proposal. Further reasons will emerge in the course of going through the counter-arguments.

1. It is agreed that the present position of the *Zeus Hymn* is abrupt. Commentators constantly refer to Agamemnon's dilemma: that dilemma is expressed at 206 ff. («a heavy doom... but heavy too...»). vv. 156-57 speak only of «what was fated, along with much that was good».

2. For the *Zeus Hymn* to have any relevance to the dilemma in its present place it would have to be anticipatory. Such a procedure is unparalleled in a tragic chorus, and for a long time the audience would see no relevance.

3. The reference in 186 to «not blaming any prophet» only makes sense if the prophet has already pronounced the ἄλλο μῆχαρ of 199.

4. The oxymoronic words of 216-17, speaking of θέμις in the same breath as «thirsting for the blood of the virgin», provide an ideal springboard for the *Zeus Hymn*, with the harsh lesson it has to teach.

5. With the transposition, the foreboding of 147 f. (μή τινας ἀντιπνόους... ἀπλοίας τεύχη) receives its answer relatively promptly, without being interrupted by a philosophic and religious excursus.

6. We know that such dislocations of choral stanzas can and do take place. In Aeschylus alone it has been plausibly suggested that *Pers.* 93-100 should follow 114 (O. Müller); *Suppl.* 88-90 should interchange with 93-95 (Westphal); *Cho.* 434-438 should follow 455 (Schuetz); and *Cho.* 623-30 should follow 638 (Preuss). Less well known, but worth serious consideration, are the proposals to switch *Soph. OT* 190-202 with 203-215 (Haase); and *Eur. Andr.* 1027-1036 with 1037-1046 (Musgrave).

Here now is a text of the passage in question, with the transposition built in:

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| 156 | τοιάδε Κάλχας ξὺν μεγάλοις ἀγαθοῖς ἀπέκλαξεν
μόρσμι' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ὀδίων οἴκοις βασιλείοις·
τοῖς δ' ὁμόφωνον |
| 159 | αἴλινον αἴλινον εἶπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω. |
| 192 | πνοαὶ δ' ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος μολοῦσαι
κακόσχολοι, νήστιδες, δύσορμοι,
βροτῶν ἄλαι, |

- 195 ναῶν <τε> καὶ πεισμάτων ἀφειδεῖς,
παλμμήκη χρόνον τιθεῖσαι
τρίβῳ κατέξαινον ἄνθος Ἄργεί-
ων· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μικροῦ
χείματος ἄλλο μῆχαρ
- 200 βριθύτερον πρόμοισιν
μάντις ἐκλαγξεν προφέρων
Ἄρτεμιν, ὥστε χθόνα βά-
κτροις ἐπικρούσαντας Ἄτρεί-
δας δάκρυ μὴ κατασχεῖν,
- 205 ἀναξ [δ'] ὁ πρέσβυς τόδ' εἶπε φωνῶν·
«βαρεῖα μὲν κῆρ τὸ μὴ πιθέσθαι,
βαρεῖα δ' , εἰ
τέκνον δαῖξω, δόμων ἀγαλμα,
μυαίνων παρθενοσφάγοισιν
- 210 ῥεῖθροις πατρώϊους χέρας πέλας βω-
μοῦ· τί τῶνδ' ἄνευ κακῶν;
πῶς λιπόνους γένωμαι
ξυμμαχίας ἀμαρτῶν;
πανσανέμου γὰρ θυσίας
- 215 παρθενίου θ' αἵματος αὐ-
δαὶ περιόργως <σφ'> ἐπιθυ-
μεῖν θέμις· εὐ γὰρ εἶη.»
- 160 Ζεὺς ὅστις πότε ἔστιν, εἰ τόδ' αὐ-
τῷ φίλον κεκλημένωι
τοῦτό νιν προσενέπω·
οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι
πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος
- 165 πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος
χρῆ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως·
- οὐδ' ὅστις πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας,
παμμάχωι θράσει βρῦων,
- 170 οὐδέ λέξεται πρὶν ὧν·
ὅς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφω, τρια-
κτῆρος οἶχεται τυχῶν·
Ζῆνα δὲ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων
τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν·
- 175 τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς δδώ-
σαντα, τὸν πάθει μάθος
θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν·
στάζει δ' ἄνθ' ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίας
μνησιπτήμων πόνος· καὶ παρ' ἄ-
κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν·
δαμιόνων δὲ που χάρις βίαιος
σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων.
- καὶ τόθ' ἡγεμῶν ὁ πρέ-
σβυς νεῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
185 μάντιν οὐτίνα ψέγων,

- ἐμπαίοις τύχαιοι συμπνέων,
 εὐτ' ἀπλοῖαι κεναγγεῖ βαρύνοντ'
 Ἀχαικὸς λεώς,
 190 Χαλκίδος πέραν ἔχων παλιρρόχθοις ἐν Αὐλίδος πόροις
- 218 ἐπεὶ γ' ἀνάγκας ἔδω λέπαδνον
 φρονὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν
 220 ἀναγνον, ἀνίερνον, τόθεν
 τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω·
 βροτοῦς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις
 τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων·
 ἔτλα δ' οὖν θυτῆρ γενέ-
 225 σθαι θυγατρὸς, γυναικοποι-
 ων πολέμων ἀρωγάν
 καὶ προτέλεια αἰῶν.

Fraenkel's literal translation, modified to take account of the interpretation proposed in this paper, would read as follows:

Such were the fated happenings which, together with great blessings, Calchas cried to the royal house (as portended) from the birds on the way; in harmony therewith say «woe! woe!», but may the good prevail!

But gales coming from the Strymon, with harmful leisure, starvation, bad lingering in port, wandering of the men, (gales) unsparing of ships and cables, by lengthening the time over again wasted and wore away the flower of the Argives; and when the prophet cried out to the chiefs something else more grievous as a remedy for the sore storm, revealing Artemis as the cause, so as to make the Atridae strike the ground with their staffs, unable to keep back their tears, the elder chief spoke and said this: «A heavy doom indeed is disobedience, but heavy too, if I rend my child, the delight of my house, defiling a father's hands with streams from the slaughtering of a virgin at the altar's side. Which of these courses is without evil? How can I desert the fleet, missing the alliance? He says they have a right to thirst, with all too much passion, for a sacrifice to stay the winds, the blood of the virgin; it would be a good thing»¹.

Zeus, whoever he be - if to be called and invoked by this name is pleasing to him, even thus do I address him. I have nothing whereto to liken him, weighing all in the balance, nothing save Zeus, if there is need to cast the burden of vain thought from the care-laden mind in real truth. He who aforetime was mighty, swelling with the boldness of a victor in every contest, shall not even be reckoned, since he is of the past; and he who afterward came into being met his thrower and is gone. But anyone who gladly shouts «Hail to Zeus the victor!» shall hit full on the target of understanding: it is Zeus who has put men on the way to wisdom by establishing as a valid law «By suffering shall they learn their lesson». Instead of sleep there trickles before the heart the pain of remembrance of suffering: even to the unwilling discretion comes: it is, I think, a forcible favour from the gods who sit on their solemn bench.

And then the elder leader of the Achaean fleet, not blaming any prophet, letting his spirit go with the blasts of fortune that fell upon him when the Achaean folk were sore pressed by famishing delay in port while they held the coast over against Chalcis, in the straits² of Aulis where the tides roar to

¹ The reasons for giving this text and translation will be found on p. 68.

² Reading πόροις: see CPh 83, 1988, 102. Thereafter I read ἐπεὶ γ', the γ' to emphasise the causal sense of the temporal conjunction (J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles*, Oxford 1954, 142):

and fro, when he submitted to the harness of compulsion, letting the wind of his purpose veer about and blow impious, impure, unholy, in consequence changed his mind and turned to utter recklessness; for men are emboldened by a base-counselling wretched blow to the mind, the beginning of woe. At all events he brought himself to become the sacrificer of his daughter, in aid of a war for avenging the loss of a woman and as a preliminary rite on behalf of the fleet.

Such then is the text advocated in this paper, and a literal translation of it. We may now look, in chronological sequence, at the attempts which have been made to refute it. We begin with the paper by L. Bergson in *Eranos* 65, 1967, 12-24. Bergson sees the difficulty of «blaming no prophet» at 186 when there has been nothing to blame any prophet for; at 156-57 the prophet had foreseen both good and bad, whereas at 198-202 his words had been unambiguously doom-laden and a dire remedy prescribed, and so, the present paper maintains, «blaming no prophet» should come after the second, not the first, reference to Calchas. Bergson also agrees that v. 187 «cannot possibly have a backward reference to Agamemnon's situation after v. 217, i.e. be another way of expressing ἀνάγκας ἔδου λέπαδνον. We must therefore either transpose, or explain». Bergson tries the latter: «He is an example of a man who, not blaming any seer, puts up with fortune. He proved to be that sort of man when Calchas' forebodings turned out to be true» (p. 20). Does any one really believe that 186-87 are a sort of thumbnail sketch of Agamemnon, the sort of man who could be relied upon not to go round blaming seers?

Bergson's other main assault is against the contention that the real point of ἀμηχανία which triggers the *Zeus Hymn*, is not 156-59 but 206-17. He denies that there is any ἀμηχανία at 206-17, and argues that Agamemnon's use of θέμις proves that he has made up his mind. If so, he has done it very quickly, since only a moment before he has been weighing the alternatives, which he finds equally unattractive. As for θέμις, the idea that this is Agamemnon's own assessment of the situation, as opposed to his assessment of how either the army or Artemis view it, is one which few scholars would support - but more of this later.

Two years later³ Peradotto was also seeing Agamemnon's decision as determined by his character. «If Agamemnon is victimised, it is by his own ἦθος» (p. 257); and later «The πρόταρχος ἄτη of the trilogy is not an external force, but Atreid ἦθος» (from which, incredibly, Orestes was immune, having been brought up by first Cilissa and second Strophios!). Yet even Peradotto has a sentence which has a bearing on the correct order of the stanzas. He warns us against confusing two elements, descriptive narrative and religious generalisation. «The first states an individual and contingent fact; the second, usually made after the event, sees it as an instance of universal and

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pare what is said about the causal/temporal sense of τόθεν, below, p. 63. Once the stanza had been erroneously placed after v. 217 the corruption to ἐπεὶ δ' was all but inevitable.

³ Phoenix 23, 1969, 237-63.

necessary law» (p. 251). It is that sequence which the transposition of the *Zeus Hymn* brings into existence.

Another scholar who would pin the blame on Agamemnon personally was O. Smith⁴. «Having made his decision, he loses his sanity of mind; this however is the result of his decision, not the cause» (p. 8). The question «result or cause?» is clearly one which has an important bearing on what we are discussing, and Smith's misconception needs instant refutation before we proceed any further. παρακοπά can only mean a knocking sideways, and a person cannot knock himself from within⁵.

There is another linguistic point to consider: ἀνάγκη. If pressed, O. Smith would doubtless have replied that «the harness of necessity» is not, as Page and many others argue, a harness which cannot be escaped, but a harness which cannot be escaped once (voluntarily) put on⁶. That in turn leads us to a third point, the meaning of τότεν (220). In his translation Fraenkel gives «from that moment» and those same words appear in the Page note on v. 220. But in his commentary Fraenkel is more careful, and speaks of «the starting-point of the fateful change of mind», and later, in the note on v. 223 writes «It is perhaps no accident that in the surviving plays of Aeschylus τότεν only occurs in these two passages [sc. this one and *Pers.* 97 ff.] which are so closely akin in thought». «The surviving plays of Aeschylus» is needlessly restrictive: the lexicon has only three other places to offer, and the sense is always one of cause rather than of time, even at *Ap. Rhod.* 4.520, ἐκ τότεν ἔξοτε, where the ἔξοτε marks the time, and the ἐκ τότεν explains the origin of the name κεραύνια. And if it is objected that the five examples are not enough to exclude a purely temporal sense, then the entries in *LSJ* s. vv. ὄθεν and πόθεν will be found to confirm this causal, point-of-origin nuance. It follows that Agamemnon's change of mind (μετέγνω) - which must therefore have been hitherto resistant to the idea of sacrificing Iphigenia -

⁴ *Eranos* 71, 1973, 1-11.

⁵ The question whether Ἄτη is also originally a blow from without I discussed long ago (*HSCP* 72, 1968, 89-123), concluding that it was, as Havers had argued. *Cho.* 467-68 is plain enough: ἄτας αἱματόεσσα πλαγά. To the reference to *Soph. Ant.* 1097 (ἄτη πατάξαι θυμόν) I could usefully have added the κοπίς (in my view a certain emendation), defined as λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς, which comes in the Ἄτη ode in the same play, beginning at 582. Smith provided an unexpectedly early falsification of my statement (p. 97) «no one has ever doubted that in function παρακοπά is either identical with, or else an instantaneous manifestation of, what the poet elsewhere calls Ἄτη». On p. 110 n. 35 I drew attention to the predilection for παρα- compounds in ἄτη and ἁμαρτία contexts, and if I had been re-writing the article today I would have drawn attention to the web of key-words in *Theognis* 884-87, where good men are the recipients of misfortune: ἀμηχανίη, παράγει, ἀμπλακίη, βλάπτουσα and ἀνάγκη.

⁶ «It hardly needs adding that nobody can seriously believe that the reference in ἀνάγκη here is not to the action which he now undertakes but to the inevitable consequences of that action» (*Denniston-Page*, 88). Dr. Smith would have been amused to learn that this note almost certainly owes its origin to me, who as an undergraduate tried to urge on Page the interpretation which «nobody can seriously believe».

was the result of, not the cause of, assuming the harness of necessity, the necessity brought about by the ἄπλοια.

Now there is another problem of chronology, one which neither Fraenkel nor Page confront. It is the use of the present participle πνέων in the «harness of necessity» clause, because it seems to anticipate in an awkward manner the main παντότολμον sentence. How does it come about that Agamemnon is already «breathing» something called τροπαίαν at the same time as he assumes the harness of necessity, and before he changes his mind (μετέγνων), the idea already implicit in τροπαίαν? The answer lies in v. 187, the verse with which, according to Page, «there is no special connection», that same verse which, with the transposition, is separated from 219 by just five short lines. Observe how well ἔμπαίσις (παίω) agrees with παρακοπά (κόπτω). Understanding 219 becomes very much easier once it is interpreted in the light of a 187 which will have preceded but a moment before. The harness of necessity and the ἔμπαίσις τύχαι are really the same thing, and πνέων and the rest in 219 a restatement of 187. But there is this difference, that the choice of words in 219-21 opens the door to Aeschylus' favourite theme of Ἄτη, in its manifestation here as παρακοπά. That Aeschylus knows that there is some blurring here of what drives Agamemnon to his decision, whether it is *force majeure* or a mental imbalance sent by the gods⁷ (which to a logical, but not necessarily to a poetic, mind is the same thing) is probably the reason why the sentence which starts at 224 is linked to what has led up to it by the combination of particles δ' οὖν. Those who savour the words of Denniston on δ' οὖν (pp. 460-64) are likely to conclude that what was passing through Aeschylus' mind at the time he wrote them was something like «So much for this rather tricky subject of motivation; the main thing is that Agamemnon did screw himself up to the point of being a filicide. Now let's get on with the story».

The preceding remarks will explain why we must reject statements such as the one which describes παρακοπά as «the mad courage engendered by one's first experience of major crime»⁸; or «Ἄτη came upon him, now that he had made the fatal decision»⁹.

⁷ And it is sent by the gods. S.E. Lawrence, *AJPh* 97, 1976, 99 says with reference to παρακοπά that «It seems reasonable to take it that Zeus and the Olympians are not inactive here». Aeschylus, by contrast, thinks more of chthonic deities at *Eum.* 329-33, but the description given there of the effects of παρακοπά would require no modification if applied to Agamemnon.

⁸ M. Evans, *Ramus* 4, 1975, 17-32.

⁹ M.W. Edwards, *CSCA* 10, 1977, 25. One might then think that Ἄτη came so late that it had nothing much to do, but Edwards argues that it emboldens Agamemnon not to make the decision, but to carry it out, i.e. make the sacrifice. I doubt if Aeschylus would have understood these nice distinctions and to the question (p. 18), does Ἄτη appear before Agamemnon makes up his mind or afterwards, the answer is that, strictly speaking, it does not appear at all: παρακοπά does - but see above. Edwards is however right in his belief that 218-24 are not a continuation but a repetition.

In the same year as Lawrence's article (n. 7 above) there appeared one by Conacher¹⁰, which, though largely concerned with other matters, pauses to take a side-swipe at the transposition proposal. «Dawe's argument would, in my opinion, be convincing only if he could show that there was no backward reference, no point of ἀμηχανία (not simply the backward reference which he would like to see) in the hymn to Zeus, and this he has failed to do» (p. 331, n. 7); and he speaks airily of «one of those abrupt switches typical of Aeschylus' dramatic use of lyric». We may perhaps draw an analogy with intelligence testing. A subject is presented with an object containing holes of different shapes and sizes, and he is presented also with other objects which will slot neatly into those holes. His intelligence is measured by his aptitude in putting the right insert into the right hole. It may well be possible to let small round objects drop into large square holes, or to hammer large square objects into round holes not designed to accommodate them. The question is not what is possible, but what is right, and it is the man who matches the right object to the right hole who τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν. The same answer may be returned to M. Weglage¹¹, who without bluffing about Aeschylus' «abrupt switches» («An völlig unerwarteten Orte bricht er mitten in die leidvolle Erzählung von der Vorgeschichte des trojanischen Krieges hinein») none the less is willing to accept the possible, because it is possible: «Die stärkere Einbindung des Textes, um die sich Dawe bemüht, scheint mir auch am traditionellen Platz möglich». In other words, *credo quia possibile*.

Just how difficult 160-91 are to explain in their present position may be gauged by two major abnormalities of interpretation which surfaced in the period 1978-1980. We begin with Neitzel, who in two articles¹² argued that the adverse winds, and hence the demand for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, were Artemis' way of putting pressure on Agamemnon to give up the expedition («Sie bittet die Atriden um nichts anderes als die Aufgabe des Feldzugs»). This is of course irreconcilable with 150 (σπευδομένα θυσίαν) and with the prepositional prefix in συμ-πνέων¹³. The words in 179 ff. are strangely interpreted as referring to the chorus' Angst («Die drei Strophen sind bestimmt von der angstvollen Sorge der alten Argiver»), although their highly personal tone fits only an Agamemnon, and 212 f. is ungrammatically construed («er bezeichnet also die Aufgabe des Zugs, d.h. σωφροσύνη, als ἀμαρτία») and the defence of τῶν in τῶι πάθει betrays an equally insecure grasp of the language. We need not therefore be much disconcerted at being told that «Dawes Umstellung des Hymnus hat

¹⁰ Phoenix 30, 1976, 328-36.

¹¹ Hermes 119, 1991, 265-81.

¹² Hermes 106, 1978, 406-25 and 107, 1979, 10-32.

¹³ The uncomfortable evidence of σπευδομένα and πέμπει... Ζεύς is explained away with words like «Er [Zeus] tut es eben deswegen, weil dies für sein Ziel, den sophronismos Agamemnons, notwendig ist». As for συμπνέων; that «weist darauf hin, dass Agamemnon mit den Gegenwinden der Artemis gegen das Unternehmen "mitbläst". In seiner Aporie liess er sich also zunächst vom "Wehen" der Vernunft tragen».

die merkwürdige Konsequenz, dass der Zuhörer die Kriterien, welche er besitzen muss, um Agamemnons Entscheidung beurteilen und die ihr folgende Kritik der alten Argiver verstehen zu können, erst nach Agamemnons Entscheidung erfährt». As if we needed to be told that daughter-slaughter (West's phrase) is wrong!

Neitzel's second article, which labels the proposed transposition as 'nur ein letztes verzweifertes Mittel, Sinn in die Sinnlosigkeit der traditionellen Interpretation zu bringen' shows no great advance in mastery of the Greek language, to judge from the translation of πύργων κτήνη πρόσθε τὰ δημοπλήθεα as «alles Vieh der Türme (Mauern) [= Trojans!] vormals das volkreiche». The allegation that τὸ μὴ πιθέσθαι (206) «meint militärischen Ungehorsam» will astonish many, and the statement on 216 f. (p. 30) that «mit keinem Wort hat Aischylos bisher die «allies» erwähnt» is incomprehensible (Ξυμμαχίας 212).

In the same year as this second article of Neitzel's, there appeared a piece in the journal which started all the trouble, written by R.B. Egan¹⁴. He writes: «On balance, then, I would say that Dawe's proposal, while it nicely eliminates the troublesome matter of the "hymn" interrupting the sequence of the narrative, also solves another problem which is more illusory than real and which seems almost to have been created to accommodate the solution» - by which he means the apparent clash of θέμυς and δυσοεβῆ (219). The idea that Aeschylus set out to create problems so that some one 2500 years later might have the pleasure of solving them has a certain charm to it, but it is not one that will carry conviction with the sternest judges. Neither will Egan's own solution, which is to suppose that the *Zeus Hymn* is spoken by Calchas, and that the ἀμηχανία is his. We may cut short a refutation of this suggestion by noting that Calchas' speech is clearly ended at βασιλείους (157). Egan himself is aware of this, but anticipates the objection that a quotation once closed cannot be silently reopened by appealing to *Cho.* 309 ff., where, however, the curious reader will find no parallel at all.

P.M. Smith's monograph on the *Zeus Hymn* focuses on aspects which have little bearing on its rightful position. Its most startling proposal is that the person being thought of at 176 ff. is not Agamemnon, and not the chorus itself, but Paris¹⁵. But there has been no mention of Paris since v. 61, which is enough to saw through this major plank in his interpretation of the whole; not but what there are a number of useful points made on matters of detail.

In 1982 L. Bergson returned to the fray¹⁶. He swallows Neitzel's contention that Artemis is trying to prevent the expedition, and sees Agamemnon's choice as one between obeying Zeus and obeying Artemis. «Agamemnon trifft die Entscheidung

¹⁴ *Eranos* 77, 1979, 1-9.

¹⁵ *ACS* 5, 1980, 27; see also M. Gagarin, *Aeschylean Drama*, Berkeley 1976, 139 f.; endorsed by R. Thiel, *Chor und tragische Handlung im 'Agamemnon' des Aischylos*, Stuttgart 1993, 104 ff.

¹⁶ *Hermes* 110, 1982, 137-45.

zugunsten der Hybris nicht trotz besseren Wissens und nicht aus freien Stücken; er weiss nicht, wie er handeln soll, denn er ist von zwei Mächten bedrängt und befindet sich in völliger ἀμηχανία... In seinen Worten 214-17 offenbart sich seine παρακοπά». Now it is never said that Agamemnon's conduct is ὕβρις; and if it is, then it will be ὕβρις whichever decision he takes, because he will be defying either Zeus or Artemis. The analysis also implies that the meaning of 214-17 is clear, and that (a popular interpretation) Agamemnon is calling daughter-slaughter a matter of θέμις without any further qualification. If that were so, then we might indeed be tempted to agree that the balance of his mind is disturbed, and apply the word παρακοπά to it. West's Teubner text and his accompanying *Studies*¹⁷ take a diametrically opposite view, and we must now therefore take a closer look at this vexed passage. Keck had argued: «The γάρ sentence must represent the moral dilemma in which the King finds himself, and so it is immediately clear that Θέμις here can only be the Goddess of eternal Right herself, who angrily opposes the impassioned nature of the alliance». Write therefore ὄργᾱ: περιόργως δέ γ' ἀπαυδαῖ Θέμις. West rightly recoils from the abuse of δέ γε, and stresses the desirability of keeping ὄργᾱ περιόργως together. This gives us ὄργᾱ περιόργως ἀπό δ' αὐδαῖ Θέμις. The West version is superior to Keck's on another account too: it is inconceivable that Themis should ever get «excessively angry». It would be like seeing the blindfold figure of Justice who holds the scales above the Old Bailey (London's criminal court) getting into a frightful tantrum¹⁸.

But this takes us to another point, and one which undermines the Keck-West interpretation. If Themis opposes the daughter-slaughter, she by the same token opposes the will of Zeus who is sending the expedition to Troy, and the will of Artemis too, whether in her embodiment as Hekate (the Teubner text at 140) or not. But Themis is a close associate of Zeus. Indeed according to the twenty-third Homeric Hymn they enjoy intimate chats together. Themis, *qua* great goddess, cannot forbid what such deities have prescribed. But Themis need not be a great goddess. The word can denote what in his discussion West, with sound instinct, translates as «legitimate». In his Aeschylean lexicon Italic distinguishes between the uses of the word as *fas* and as goddess, and early in the entry in Ellendt's Sophoclean counterpart we find the excerpt from the *Etym. Magn.*: Θέμις δηλοῖ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν σωματικὴν θεάν. That the craving for Iphigeneia's blood is felt by the army, and not Agamemnon, Calchas, Artemis, or any other candidate, is something rightly stressed by West. But then he argues from the premise that «The concept of θέμις is normally applied to the sphere of action, not that of thought or emotion» to the conclusion «The burning question is

¹⁷ *Studies in Aeschylus*, Stuttgart 1990, 178-81.

¹⁸ *Der Kleine Pauly* 5.676 informs us that «Die bekannteste Darstellung der Themis ist die grosse Statue aus dem Themis-Tempel in Rhamnus (3 Jh.) die in der 1. Hand wahrscheinlich eine Waage hielt».

not whether it is legitimate for them to feel like that, but whether it is legitimate for him to do the deed, and we should expect θέμις in the context to have this reference». The premise is not unassailable, though admittedly protected by the word «normally». Attitude and action are often merged in each other. Θέμις is, for instance, used with σεβίζειν at OC 1556, but there is an act of prayer involved. It is common with verbs of speaking (αὐδᾶν, the word here, at Soph. El. 127) and hearing. «The army's craving, to Agamemnon, is a fact of the situation that puts pressure on him». So West, correctly. Can he dismiss that pressure? No, because from the army's point of view they have a perfect right to expect their commander to act for what they perceive to be the common good, ending the unsatisfactory situation described at 192 ff. What gives a bitter point to Agamemnon's words is the juxtaposition of that sentiment with such words as «the blood of a maiden», the sacrifice of his own daughter. It is the same bitterness that underlies χάρις βίαιος, virtually a χάρις ἄχαρις. It has to be added that ἐπιθυμεῖν, which West would like to get rid of altogether, suits the tone very well. The text and translation given early in this article, «He (sc. Calchas) says they have a right to thirst, with all too much passion, for a sacrifice...» meets every requirement, but the translation given of εὖ γὰρ εἴη needs some justification. Because of the refrain τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω, and because an optative without ἄν normally, as its name implies, expresses a wish, these three words are regularly translated as “may all be well”». But as we look at Fraenkel's translation we see his mental supplements occupy more space than the text they surround; <It shall be done>; for <my hope is>; may all be well. That γὰρ is worrying. We should at least consider the possibility that we have a potential optative without ἄν¹⁹. «It would be [from their point of view] a good thing»²⁰.

One last point before we see what the transposition leaves us with. καὶ τόθ' (184) is explained by Fraenkel as an exemplification of a general law. He cites two parallels; the first (Ag. 399) contains οἶος, and the second (θ 329 f.) ὤς, words which would suit the present context if Fraenkel's interpretation were correct, but which are simply not there. Nor is it clear how or when what follows 184 can be said to exemplify that general law, of φρονεῖν, πάθει μάθος, σωφρονεῖν and the μνησιπήμων πόνος. These are things which will only come after the deed has been done, or at any rate after the unhappy realisation that the deed must be done (198 ff.), and only the transposition will secure that order. With the transposition, καὶ τόθ' means exactly what it says:

¹⁹ On this usage, see K. - G. I 225 s.

²⁰ So Schuetz: «εὖ γὰρ εἴη male reddidit Stanleius, quod bene eveniat; est enim h.l. excusandi formula, qua rex significat, se non magnopere posse Graecos culpāre, quod Iphigeniae mactationem flagitent; esset enim, inquit, utile et conducibile». Wecklein reports that Schuetz conjectured εὖ γ' ἄν εἴη but I have found no trace of this in his editions. One other point of textual detail, at v. 227, «the preliminary sacrifices for ships». In the context, where we have learnt of pressure on Agamemnon coming from the alliance, a more suitable word might have been λαῶν, a preliminary sacrifice on behalf of the army.

«and then» i.e. it introduces the next stage after the full realisation of the nature of the dilemma and the only real way of ending it. The transposition also secures another and greater benefit: the huge sentence beginning at 184, running as ἡγεμών + participle + participle + εὔτε clause with participle (ἔχων) + additional πνοαί clause with participle (193) + participle (196) + ἐπεὶ clause + participle + ὥστε clause, terminating in ἀναξ ὁ πρέσβυς²¹, is replaced by two sentences, each of moderate length: 1) πνοαί + participle + participle + verb; 2) ἐπεὶ clause + participle + ὥστε clause, again terminating in ἀναξ ὁ πρέσβυς.

The structure of the whole is this: Calchas at 156 has expressed both hope and apprehension. Should we say αἰλινον or will the good prevail? The answer is given: winds require the sacrifice. Agamemnon's dilemma, personal agony - v - public demand. Why this brutal choice? (205-17). Answer: because that is how Zeus operates²². Men have to learn the hard way (160-83). Agamemnon acquiesces in *force majeure* (184-91), and so did the unthinkable (218 ff.)

Now let us try a semi-scientific test. We know from the *kommos* in *Cho.* that a long passage of lyrics in Aeschylus may contain numerous echoes. For an echo to be an echo, recognisable as such, and not just a separate manifestation of the same word or thought, it must occur within a relatively short distance of its counterpart, and this law we find observed in the *kommos*. What results emerge if we apply this test to the sections of the *parodos* under scrutiny?

	WITH TRANSPOSITION	WITHOUT
ἀντιπνόους (147)... πνοαί (192)	13	45
χρονίας (147)... παλιμμήκη χρόνον (196)	16	49
ἀπλοίας (149)... ἀπλοῖαι (188)	51	39
θυσίαν ἐτέραν (150)... ἄλλο μῆχαρ (199)	17	49
ἀπέκλαγξεν (156)... ἔκλαγξεν (201)	13	45
φρενῶν (175) and φρονεῖν (176)... φρονεῖν (221)	20, 19	46, 45
μνησιπήμων (180)... πρῶτοπήμων (223)	17	43
ἡγεμών ὁ πρέσβυς (184)... ἀναξ ὁ πρέσβυς (205)	35	21
ἐμπαίους (187)... παρακοπά (223) [παιῖω/κόπτω]	10	36

²¹ The δ^ς should be deleted (Karsten). On the rarity of apodotic δέ in Aeschylus see Denniston, 177. Both Page and West decline to print one at *Sept.* 750: even the examples cited for Sophocles in Denniston's Index turn out to be confined to phrases like οὐτῶ δέ or δ' ὅμως, now that γ' is accepted for OT 1267.

²² Compare the last line of Sophocles *Tr.*, and the second line of *Ant.* as printed in my third Teubner edition. There is, however, one difference: Aeschylus still sees Zeus as something personal: he says ὅστις, while Sophocles says ὅτι.

σμπνέων (187)... πνέων (219)

6

32

TOTAL 217

450

By this criterion, the chances are over two to one that the transposition is correct. As to how this dislocation, and the other six referred to on p. 59, came about, we can only speculate. What we do know is that such a phenomenon has taken place in recent times. The first American edition of H. James' *The Ambassadors* (Harpers and Brothers 1903) reversed the correct sequence of Chapters 28 and 29, and this error passed unnoticed and perpetuated itself in all subsequent American and English editions until 1960.

Cambridge

R. D. Dawe

Osservazioni:

Esiste un problema di carattere generale, sul quale intendo soffermarmi anzitutto: il tipo di logica che presiede alle nostre operazioni di *emendatio*. Nell'*editio maior* del suo intervento cagliaritano, voglio dire nella forma che è stata presentata agli Aeschylean fellows e che comparirà su Eranos, Roger D. Dawe parla di *Strophic Displacements*, e ne ricorda un esempio per Sofocle (*OT* 190-202 dopo il v. 215: Haase), uno per Euripide (*Andr.* 1027-036 dopo il v. 1046: Musgrave), ben cinque per Eschilo. Questi sono *Pers.* 93-100, spostati dopo il 114 da O. Müller, *Suppl.* 88-90, scambiati con 93-95 da R. Westphal, *Ag.* 160-91 dopo il v. 217 (Dawe stesso), *Cho.* 434-38 dopo il 455 (Schütz) e *Cho.* 623-30 dopo il v. 638 (Preuss). Confesso che ognuna delle volte che ho letto questa esposizione non ho potuto sottrarmi a un senso di ammirazione e a un'adesione agli argomenti addotti: in ognuno dei casi proposti la *traiectio* consente uno sviluppo più lineare del pensiero. Dopo un po' che ho finito la lettura, e che mi sono compiaciuto meco medesimo del consenso che ho provato per gli argomenti di Dawe, un diavoletto maligno mi insinua un dubbio: sarà un caso che proprio per il drammaturgo che struttura i suoi drammi con una logica di tipo arcaico, influenzata dalla lingua della preghiera e dallo stile oracolare e comunque spesso lontana dalla linearità delle argomentazioni care alla τέχνη oratoria propria delle generazioni seguenti, sia stato suggerito più del doppio delle trasposizioni che sono state proposte per gli altri due messi insieme? Si pensi anche alla differenza notevole di estensione tra i diversi corpora, che dà cinque trasposizioni per sette tragedie, contro due per ventisei, e questo anche se si conserva ad Eschilo il *PV*, il che non è probabilmente il punto di vista predominante tra i colleghi anglofoni; altrimenti avremmo in Eschilo cinque trasposizioni su sei testi, contro due su ventisette di altri testi tragici conservati; se poi ci si rapporta al numero dei versi che leggiamo,

escludendo ovviamente i frammenti, abbiamo per Eschilo cinque trasposizioni su un totale di 7923 versi, sempre escludendo il *Prometeo*, dunque una trasposizione su ogni 1404,6 versi, mentre sommando il *PV*, le sette tragedie di Sofocle e le diciannove del *corpus Euripideum* abbiamo un totale di 37.470 vv., con una trasposizione ogni 18.735 versi: facendo infine la proporzione, troviamo che in Eschilo le trasposizioni sono 13,338 volte più frequenti che nel complesso di tutti gli altri tragici. Se non vogliamo ammettere che qualche misteriosa maledizione abbia colpito il testo di Eschilo, non possiamo rimuovere per ora il sospetto (che dovrebbe essere poi oggetto di una verifica puntuale) che la logica del poeta di Eleusi non coincida sempre con quella dei suoi critici, e che questi abbiano ragione secondo il loro modello di consequenzialità, una consequenzialità che tuttavia potrebbe non essere necessariamente quella del poeta che studiano.

Vittorio Citti

Page 63: Against the second argument it might be said that the reference to the second sacrifice at 150 already points the audience to the relevance of the *Zeus Hymn*.

Page 65: In the text printed on p. 65 there is a colon at the end of 191, whereas in the translation here there is only a comma. It is not entirely clear to me whether ἐπει is to be taken as corresponding with τόθ' at 184 («at that time... when»), or whether, as p. 67 seems to indicate, it introduces a clause subordinate to μετέγνων at 221. I am not sure (n. 2) how it can be both temporal and causal at the same time.

Pages 65 and 72: I still favour the view that θέμις represents Agamemnon's own assessment of the situation. Anyone who is making up his mind to do something that he feels to be wrong is likely to try to persuade himself, not only that it is legitimate in the circumstances, but that it is positively the right thing to do.

Page 67: The language throughout the strophe certainly suggests that the Chorus itself, at least in some sense, pins the responsibility on Agamemnon. I should welcome a little more guidance as to what the «harness of necessity» does mean. Is it the requirement laid upon Agamemnon to make a decision, or his judgement that the reason for sacrificing Iphigeneia is so much weightier than the reason for not doing so that he says to himself «I have no choice»? The strophe does not necessarily describe a chronologically later stage than the preceding stanza. It might simply sum up the account of Agamemnon's decision.

Page 72: Is θέμις to be taken as an indeclinable accusative, with εἶναι understood? If so, I have doubts. I am not sure of the relevance of Soph. *El.* 127: «it is right to say this» is not the same as «he says that it is right».

Page 72 n. 19: K. - G. in fact express doubts about the existence of the potential optative without ἄν in Attic. It seems to be restricted to particular forms of expression; see my notes on *Cho.* 172, 591-93.

Page 73: The principle of «a relatively short distance» is a little arbitrary. *Pers.* 532 ff., for example, repeats much of the vocabulary of the parodos. Would it be wrong to describe these repetitions as «echoes»?

Alex F. Garvie

Les nouveaux arguments proposés par R.D. Dawe pour la transposition des vers 160-91 et sa revue des contre-arguments permettent de progresser dans la discussion. Je reste néanmoins attaché à l'ordre des vers transmis pour les raisons suivantes:²³

— Avec l'ordre donné par les manuscrits, nous avons un effet de composition en anneau: l'«Hymne à Zeus», qui ouvre la partie iambique de la parodos, énonce la loi du savoir par la souffrance; cette loi est reprise, et spécifiée, à la fin du chant (et de cette partie iambique) en 250 s.: «Justice pèse de tout son poids sur ceux qui subissent pour qu'ils sachent». Il ne s'agit pas là à proprement parler d'un argument, mais d'un constat qui n'est pas sans valeur pour une composition poétique.

— Si l'on adopte la transposition, il faut expliquer pourquoi le lieu de l'action (avec la géographie donnée aux v. 190 s.) est désigné et précisé si tard, alors que le récit est déjà engagé: quel serait le sens de cette précision géographique à ce moment-là du récit? Avec l'ordre transmis, 'Strymon' suit juste la mention d'autres lieux ('Chalcis', 'Aulis').

— Avec l'ordre des manuscrits, la proposition temporelle en 188 ss. (*eut' aploiai kennagei...*) pose un thème général, le blocus, qui est ensuite analysé et développé par 192 ss., selon une technique bien connue des récits. Avec la transposition, il faudrait dire quelle fonction pourrait avoir une telle phrase: pourquoi un tel retour en arrière, pourquoi une phrase dont le contenu informatif, après 194 ss., serait vide?

— Le v. 187 (*mantin outina psegôn*) ne fait pas vraiment difficulté. Il est sans doute exclu d'y voir une anticipation des vers 202 ss., avec la réaction des Atrides à l'évocation d'Artémis par Calchas (encore qu'un tel type d'anticipation n'est pas impossible dans un récit lyrique, et non épique, qui a souvent pour règle de commencer par ce qui se révélera être le point décisif du récit). Ce qui a été dit de Calchas dans la triade qui ouvre la parodos lyrique suffit à créer la situation qui motive 187. Agamemnon (dans une sorte de contre-scène d'Hom. A 106 ss.) ne conteste pas l'interprétation du présage par le devin: les vents et le blocus qu'il annonçait (v. 149 s.) sont devenus réalité.

— J'ai l'impression que Dawe minimise la rupture marquée par *epei de kai* en 199. Or c'est visiblement avec cette phrase que l'injonction d'Artémis est introduite. Auparavant, on n'avait encore qu'une crainte du devin, à laquelle il voulait opposer une

²³ Certains de ces arguments ont pu être déjà proposés. Je n'ai pas vérifié à chaque fois. Quelques-uns des éléments que je développe ici ont été déjà présentés par J. Bollack, dans sa discussion de l'article de R. Dawe et dans son commentaire de la parodos (*L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle, Le texte et ses interprétations*, I-II, Lille-Paris 1981).

prière à Apollon (v. 149 ss.). La situation a changé; de la crainte on est passé à la certitude de la demande d'Artémis.

— Peut-on vraiment dire que «*pneôn* and the rest in 219 [= *phrenos pneôn dussebê tropaian*] (is) a restatement of 187 [= *empaiois tukhaisi sumpneôn*»? S'il y a un 'tournant' du souffle (*tropaian*), c'est qu'il y avait un souffle antérieur. On doit, je crois, distinguer deux dispositions psycho-physiologiques du roi, correspondant à deux moments distincts. En 187-88 (*mantin outina psegôn* et *empaiois tukhaisi sumpneôn*), «il est simplement dit qu'Agamemnon accepte la fatalité des vents, sans se révolter contre elle»²⁴ par ailleurs «les coups qui s'abattent» (*empaiois tukhaisi*) ne concernent sans doute pas directement le père d'Iphigénie, mais l'ensemble de l'armée (cf. *eut' aploiai...*). Le roi, dans la première partie du récit, est passif, restant soumis aux coups venus de l'extérieur; sa respiration se règle sur eux, impuissante. En 219, le souffle change; le roi devient actif. Son souffle n'est plus simplement en harmonie (cf. *sumpneôn*) avec les circonstances; il se renverse de manière à produire une audace sans limite (*to pantotolmon phronein*; Dawe a raison de donner un sens causal à *tothen*).

— Quant au fond. Le déplacement des vers 160-91 a pour point de départ l'idée que l'Hymne à Zeus concerne d'abord la souffrance d'Agamemnon à Aulis, p. 67 s.: «Why this brutal choice? (205-17). Answer because that is how Zeus operates. Men have to learn the hard way (160-83)». Mais, tout d'abord, peut-on dire qu'Agamemnon apprenne quelque chose? Il apprend seulement que la réalisation du but de guerre qu'il s'est fixé et que Zeus accepte passe par le sacrifice de sa fille. Il ne s'agit clairement pas d'une connaissance positive, d'un 'bien penser' comme le dit *phronein* au vers 176. Au contraire, cette 'souffrance' conduit Agamemnon à penser contre la raison (*to pantotolmon phronein*, v. 221). La reprise des termes mêmes de l'Hymne à la fin de la parodos, vv. 250 s., laisse entendre que la conversion de la souffrance en savoir n'a pas encore eu lieu, qu'elle est attendue, avec angoisse, par le chœur. La leçon de l'Hymne ne s'est pas encore appliquée.

On est donc plutôt amené à dire que l'Hymne, laissé à sa place, dessine le cadre théologique de toute l'action entreprise contre Troie, action commencée à Aulis avec le sacrifice, mais dont le chœur ne connaît pas encore le terme (on comprend ainsi le sens de la composition en anneau de cette partie de la parodos, cf. *supra*). Il sait seulement que le *pathos* déjà vécu ou encore à vivre (Agamemnon aura peut-être à souffrir pour ce qu'il a fait) va produire du 'savoir', mais il ne sait pas lequel précisément²⁵. Le chœur est donc dans une véritable aporie. La contradiction angoissante (cf. le refrain) entre l'annonce du succès futur des Grecs à Troie et le prix à payer pour ce succès (le sacrifice d'Iphigénie), l'amène à se tourner vers Zeus, dont il pose qu'il est le seul être

²⁴ Bollack, 260.

²⁵ En effet, en faisant de la 'souffrance' l'accès au 'savoir', à la sagesse, le chœur s'exclut lui-même de ce savoir: trop vieux, il n'agit plus, et ne peut donc, au sens propre, connaître aucun *pathos*.

qui puisse véritablement libérer de l'angoisse (vv. 160-66). Si Zeus peut libérer de l'angoisse, c'est que non seulement il est un dieu victorieux d'autres dieux (vv. 168-75), mais qu'il sait transformer la douleur humaine en connaissance positive (vv. 176-83). Or, et de là vient l'aporie, ce même dieu pousse Agamemnon à prendre Troie et donc, implicitement, à tuer sa fille, à savoir à commettre un acte impie. L'Hymne sert moins à rendre compte du désarroi d'Agamemnon, de son *pathos* (qui, en fait, ne débouche sur aucun *mathos* véritable), qu'à poser le sens *a priori* nécessaire de toute l'entreprise grecque. Or il est impossible de dire comment ce sens va se réaliser l'angoisse n'est pas encore supprimée, parce qu'Agamemnon s'est rangé du côté des criminels, même s'il l'a fait pour obéir à Zeus.

Pierre Judet de la Combe

The supposed advantages of transposing *Ag.* 160–91 to follow 217 are swamped by the drawbacks. The disproportion between Calchas' lengthy prophecy after the eagle omen (126–55) and the cursory mention of his remedy for the adverse weather (198–202) is much more noticeable and disagreeable if only a few lines separate them. But this is a minor point. What is worse is the removal of 184–91 to a later position in the narrative, because

(a) the perfectly coherent and continuous description of the ἄπλοια (188–98) is chopped into two parts which are then located far apart.

(b) Their order is reversed, so that the portion which states where the event took place (190 f.), and which contains an identification of the central character (184 f.) more explicit than that in 205, instead of coming at the beginning of the narrative, comes later, where these elements no longer serve the same useful purpose.

(c) The whole temporal clause 188–91 becomes completely redundant if it stands several stanzas after 192 ff. It also comes into awkward juxtaposition with another temporal clause, 218–20; that one begins ἐπεὶ δ', which Dawe is forced to change into ἐπεὶ γ' (not the most convincing γὰρ even among his conjectures).

In its transmitted position the «Zeus Hymn» appears as an anxious meditation prompted by the recollection of Calchas' terrifying prophecy, part of which has yet to be fulfilled and explained. The Hymn serves as a major-punctuation mark, separating the eagle omen and associated prophecy from the account of the ἄπλοια, Agamemnon's dilemma, and the sacrifice. The resumptive καὶ τότε at 184 takes us back into the narrative, and indicates that the preceding theology is relevant also to what follows. τότε means «then» in the sense of «at that time», not «after that», which is ἐπειτα.

Martin L. West

Replica:

A M.L. West

The «disproportion between Calchas' lengthy prophecy... and the cursory mention of his remedy for the adverse weather» does not really exist. Calchas had dwelt largely on the fall of Troy. His comments on adverse weather took the form ἀντιπνόους... χρονίας ἐχενήιδας ἀπλοίας. This is not out of proportion to πικροῦ χειμάτος (198-99). Calchas did not even prophesy adverse weather. What he did was to pray Paian that there should not be any adverse weather. We are naturally keen to learn whether that prayer will be answered, and with the transposition we get that answer at once.

«The coherent and continuous description of the ἄπλοια (188-98) is chopped into two parts [so much for ring-composition!]... and their order is reversed». No: the sequence εὐτ' ἀπλοίαι κ.τ.έ. would naturally come *after* a statement of what caused it, namely the πνοαὶ ἀπὸ Στρώμονας μολοῦσαι; and as for «coherent and continuous description», what is coherent and continuous about Agamemnon «not blaming any prophet» when all that prophet has been doing, on the traditional order, is praying to Paian on Agamemnon's behalf? It seems to me equally peculiar to say that the identification of the central character as ἡγεμῶν ὁ πρέσβυς νεῶν (184), is more explicit than the one at 205, ἀναξ ὁ πρέσβυς, when that description, «the senior king» immediately follows mention of the Atridae. Few prizes would have been given out in antiquity for naming the elder of the two Atridae. And not many more for knowing that it was at Aulis that the Greek ships assembled. The mention at Hom. B 303 f. is equally casual.

«The whole temporal clause 188-91 becomes completely redundant if it stands several stanzas after 192ff.». No, it does not, because it provides the introduction to the ἀνάγκας λέπαδνον which should immediately follow. Nor does it come «into awkward juxtaposition with another temporal clause, 218-20» since on my version that second clause is not purely temporal: ἐπεὶ γ' not ἐπεὶ δ'. The change of δ' to γ' is hardly a momentous one, and the minor scribal alteration would have been a sure consequence of the dislocation. The cost of this is tiny by comparison with the text which West would defend, in which the huge sprawling sentence which begins at 184 and loses itself in a maze of subordinate clauses fails ever to give us a main verb. [I wonder, incidentally, whether West would censure Aeschylus for the «awkward juxtaposition of two temporal clauses» at *Agam.* 12 and 16].

I conclude by remarking that West's dictum that «τότε means 'then' in the sense of 'at that time', not 'after that', which is ἔπειτα» is a) false and b) irrelevant. 'Then, next' says the lexicon, which takes care of a). As for b), note what I said about it: «it introduces the next stage after the full realisation of the nature of the dilemma and the only real way of ending it». This τότε is no different from hundreds of others, e.g. Soph. Phil. 271, El. 1038, OC 778, and even the spurious OT 1517. «Then, under those circumstances».

[Since writing the above, I have come across by accident an informal rescript sent me by the late F.H.Sandbach after the publication of the original Eranos article. Dr. West will be glad to learn that Sandbach shared West's geographical misgivings: «My one doubt is whether 188-91 are suitable in their new place, with this geographical detail». He may be less glad to learn that Sandbach's overall verdict was «The consequences of the transposition seem to me almost entirely favourable». As for the geography, in my original Eranos article (p. 11) I had written: «... the fact that the two stanzas have geographical references in common may have been an additional reason why the order became confused. A fanciful critic might even find some attraction in the idea that the παλιρρόχθους of the physical world (190) mirrors the moment of indecision in the world of Agamemnon's mind before he finally bows to necessity». I was perhaps closer to the truth than I knew: cf. τὰ γὰρ τοι κουφότατα ἦθη εὐμετάφορά πως καὶ Εὐρύπου δίκην ὡς ἐν παλιρροΐαι περιπλαζόμενα -, Anna Commena *Alexiad.* 2. 3 (last words).]

A A.F. Garvie

There is no problem over a conjunction being both temporal and causal at the same time (compare the English 'since'). I think my reference to Denniston p. 142 already meets that point. Euripides *Hipp.* 955 gives us for example an ἐπεὶ γ' ἔλήφθης, different but parallel to the way in which Agamemnon is 'caught'. The 'harness of necessity' is, as stated, *force majeure*. To Greek thinking this does not absolve Agamemnon of personal guilt. The point of ellipse of ἄν being dubious in Attic obscures the fact that Greek tragic choruses are not written in Attic. Their lyric inheritance provided them with such precedents as Pind. *Ol.* 3. 45 and *Pyth.* 10. 21; and most editors agree that Soph. *Ant.* 605 is a valid example. Other, more shadowy, examples have been suspected in tragedy. But Schuetz's conjecture will allow you to have your ἄν, while keeping the alternative interpretation which I had (without knowing that Schuetz had anticipated me) hit upon. The only difference between Schuetz and me is that I see Agamemnon's words as spoken with more bitterness.

Of course the case for the transposition is quite separate from the detailed restoration of this problem passage. Θέμυς indeclinable, like the latin *fas*, causes me

no worry: Aesch. *Suppl.* 336, Soph. *OC* 1191 (see Jebb's Appendix *ad loc.*), and possibly Aesch. *Cho.* 641 are powerful encouragement. This is a case where the 'no smoke without fire' argument seems persuasive: Θέμις would not appear to be indeclinable unless it really was (on occasion, that is). On the other hand, the point about the need to supply <εἶναι> is well made; and I had in fact made it myself on p. 18 of the *Eranos* 1966 article. There are two possible defences: 1) That <εἶναι> remains possible after all; 2) That αὐδᾶν means 'call', as in the passive 'be called' at Soph. *Phil.* 240, 430, and the translation should be, in effect, «He calls their extravagant blood-lust 'Themis'». But I admit to not being happy with this, or indeed with any other proposed restoration or interpretation of the passage.

A P. Judet de la Combe

May I begin by removing one obstacle to understanding which may possibly arise from an English idiom ('Men have to learn the hard way')? If a fly annoys us, and we flatten it with a rolled-up newspaper, we may accompany our revenge with the words 'That will teach you!'. But there is no expectation that the flat fly will in future be a model of prudence. Equally Agamemnon does not exactly learn anything: in πάθει μάθος the stress is all on πάθει, taking, and pre-eminently so in Agamemnon's case, the form of sleepless nights full of sorrow (179 s.)

As for the rest, you give us a clear restatement, with some refinements, of the orthodox position. Although slightly aggrieved that you use ring-composition as a defence of the traditional order, but reject it ('pourquoi un tel retour en arrière') when it comes to the newly proposed order, I would not want to add any fresh arguments to those already given in my paper.

A V. Citti

You speak, in the language of a Verdi opera, of «qualche misteriosa maledizione». I think the answer simply lies in differing types of transmission. One remembers that Wilamowitz gave the popularity of tragedy as a prime cause of the spread of literacy. If, before that happened, the first text of Aeschylus was constituted, like the first official text of Homer, by a process of oral dictation, the odds of N 338 to 1 - or put it another way five instances versus two - need no longer dismay us.